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From Empire Defence to Imperial Retreat: 
Britain's Postwar China Policy and the 
Decolonization of Hong Kong 
JAMES T. H. TANG 
University of Hong Kong 
Introduction 
Attempts to examine Hong Kong as an issue in British postwar col- 
onial policy often emphasize the unique nature of the colony, and 
therefore a special case in British decolonization. Hong Kong has 
been regarded as an unconventional colonial entity, an anachronism 
in the modern world. But others argue that the word colony is not an 
appropriate term to describe it, except in the most severely technical 
legal sense, because of its spectacular industrial and economic 
development since the end of the Second World War.' Nonetheless, 
Hong Kong has existed as a British crown colony since I842, and its 
colonial political structures have remained more or less the same until 
the early ig8os. Hong Kong's special relations with China is an 
important factor making it an oddity in post-war British decoloniza- 
tion. Instead of becoming independent like most other British colonial 
territories, Hong Kong's political future is linked to China. This 
situation of 'decolonization without independence' has been an 
important theme of academic analysis on the colony's political 
development.2 
Commenting on recent scholarship on post-I945 British colonial 
policies, R. F. Holland lamented that its quality has been marred by 
1 See for example: Nigel Cameron, An Illustrated History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 4; N.J. Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong 
Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1981), 3rd edn, p. xv; Peter Harris, Hong 
Kong: A Study in Bureaucracy and Politics (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1988), p. I i. 2 Lau Siu-kai, Decolonization without Independence: The Unfinished Political Reforms of the 
Hong Kong Government (Hong Kong: The Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, I987). 
oo26-749X/94/$5.oo+ .oo ? 1994 Cambridge University Press 
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the narrow specialism endemic to the modern profession. One major 
problem is: 'each situation had a time-frame of its own, and any 
definitive study will face the laborious task of probing the common 
denominators in these multiple settings'.3 This task is very often fur- 
ther complicated by what John Darwin referred to as 'extraordinary 
and baffling inconsistencies' in British foreign and colonial policy 
after i945. One example of such baffling inconsistencies was the fact 
that 'colonial withdrawal from South Asia was matched by the 
uncompromising re-assertion of colonial rule in Hong Kong'.4 
This essay is not intended to define the general pattern of British 
postwar decolonization through a specialist study of Britain's policy 
towards Hong Kong. Instead of searching for a common denominator 
and building the pattern of postwar British decolonization, this is an 
attempt to explain Britain's attitude towards Hong Kong by placing it 
in the context of the evolution of British foreign policy in the postwar 
world in general, and its attitude towards the rise of Chinese commu- 
nism in particular.5 
The British Empire, China, and Hong Kong in the Postwar 
World 
If Britain emerged from the Second World War with little resources 
for its imperial commitments, it certainly did not lack the will to 
maintain either the empire or its world power status. As early as 1942 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared in his famous Mansion 
House speech that the British government was not prepared to sur- 
render its imperial interests in the postwar world. In Churchill's 
famous words: 'I have not become the King's First Minister in order 
3 R. F. Holland, 'The Imperial Factor in British Strategies: From Attlee to Mac- 
millan, 1945-63' in R. F. Holland and G. Rizvi (eds), Perspectives on Imperialism and De- 
colonization: Essays in Honour of A. F. Madden (London: Frank Cass, 1984), pp. i65-6. 
4 John Darwin, 'British Decolonization since 1945: A Pattern or a Puzzle?' in 
Holland and Rizvi (eds), ibid., p. 90. 5 
Newly opened classified British official documents in the Public Record Office in 
London have generated a large number of works on postwar British foreign policy. 
Some examples of the rapidly expanding research efforts in this area are: A. Deighton 
(ed.), Britain and the First Cold War (London: Macmillan, 1990); M. Dockrill andJ. W. 
Young (eds), British Foreign Policy 1945-56 (London: Macmillan, i989); W. S. Lucas, 
Divided We Stand: Britain, the U.S., and the Suez Crisis (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
I99I); J. T. H. Tang, Britain's Encounter with Revolutionary China, I949-I954 (London: 
Macmillan, 1992); J. W. Young (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime 
Administration, I95I-1955 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988). 
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to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.'6 When Britain 
emerged victorious after the end of the war a few years after Church- 
ill's utterance about defending the Empire in the postwar world, the 
domestic political scene in Britain as well as international develop- 
ments had taken a dramatic turn. 
The Labour Party's stunning electoral victory in July i945 ended 
the Conservative Party's rule and Churchill's Prime Ministership. 
Moreover the postwar international situation which the new Labour 
government under Clement Attlee faced was undergoing rapid trans- 
formation. It became clear that Britain, with limited resources, found 
it extremely difficult to be a serious rival to either the United States or 
the Soviet Union as a major power in the increasingly bi-polar world. 
More importantly, the transfer of power to India and Pakistan in 947 
practically ended Britain's imperial position. As Phillip Darby put it 
in his fascinating study of postwar British defence policy east of Suez: 
'At a single stroke, the basis of Britain's position as an imperial power 
was gone.'7 
The end of the British empire, however, did not end British political 
leaders' aspiration that Britain could still play an important role in 
world politics. While the extent to which British postwar leaders were 
committed to creating a 'Third Force' in world politics-the idea of 
developing Britain's power and influence to rival that of the US and 
the USSR by combining the resources of Western Europe and former 
Dominions and colonies in Asia and Africa-remains controversial 
among scholars of postwar British foreign policy, there is little doubt 
that as Britain attempted to readjust its postwar overseas policies, 
British leaders envisaged that their country would continue to be a 
major player in world politics.8 The limit of British power and the 
growing apprehension of the Soviet-led communist bloc's expansion- 
ist design eventually drove British policy-makers to seek a close Atlan- 
tic alliance with the United States and allied with Washington in the 
Cold War confrontation.9 
6 C. Eade (ed.), Winston Churchill War Speeches (London: Cassell, I95I), ii, p. 344. 
7 
Phillip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez, I947-i968 (London: Oxford 
University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1973), p. Io. 
8 A useful account of the idea of the 'Third Force' is John W. Young and John 
Kent, 'British Policy Overseas: "The Third Force" and the Origins of NATO-In 
Search of a New Perspective' in Beatrice Heuser and Robert O'Neill (eds), Securing 
Peace in Europe, 1945-62: Thoughts for the Post-Cold War Era (London: Macmillan in 
association with St Antony's College Oxford, 1992). 
9 General accounts of Britain's post-war foreign policy include: Joseph Frankel, 
British Foreign Policy, I945 to I973 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, I975); F. S. 
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Britain's ambivalent attitude towards empire and the rise of com- 
munism in the early postwar years was fully demonstrated in East 
Asia; the changes in its policy towards Hong Kong as the communists 
took power in China were particularly revealing of this ambivalence. 
The Crown colony of Hong Kong-a symbol of British imperialism 
and a centre of commercial activities in South China-presented a 
particularly complex problem in Sino-British relations as the Cold 
War intensified. Britain was not willing to return Hong Kong to 
China after the war, at first because of its intention to maintain the 
empire, and later because of its aspiration to remain as a global 
power. The retention of Hong Kong, however, was turned into an 
issue in Cold War politics with the Chinese communist victory. 
The rise of Chinese communism presented a dilemma for British 
policy-makers: on the one hand they had to demonstrate solidarity 
with their US ally who was at the forefront in the Cold War conflict 
with the Communist bloc; on the other hand, they had to protect 
British interests in China. British and Chinese policy-makers were 
caught in the web of an ideologically divided world and their 
countries' practical interests. As London's imperial ambition trans- 
formed into a determination to maintain Britain's great power status, 
its China and Hong Kong policies converged with Cold War politics. 
An important outpost in the Far East of the British Empire, Hong 
Kong was a valuable trade centre to British commercial activities in 
Asia. British officials were proud of the fact that they had turned the 
colony from 'a barren rock' into 'one of the most important and 
thriving ports and markets of the world'."? Britain's acquisition of the 
Hong Kong island under the I842 Treaty of Nanking and the lease of 
the New Territories for ninety-nine years under the I898 Convention 
of Peking, however, had long been regarded as unequal treaties forced 
upon the crumbling Qing government by many Chinese. Thus while 
the British considered Hong Kong as an important commercial out- 
post in the Far East, the colony was a symbol of Western imperial 
domination in Chinese eyes. As Alexander Grantham, Governor of 
Hong Kong from 1948 to 1958, observed: 'The fundamental political 
problem of the British Colony of Hong Kong is its relationship with 
China and not the advancement to self-government and independence 
as in the case of most British colonies."'1 
Northedge, Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy, i945-73 (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1974). 
l0 Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO) CAB 129/35 CP(49) 120. 
" Alexander Grantham, Via Ports: From Hong Kong to Hong Kong (Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, 1965). 
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Thus Hong Kong's political status inevitably had to be linked with 
Britain's China policy. The outbreak of the Second World War and 
Japan's occupation of Hong Kong ended British administration of the 
colony. Even before the end of the war the Chinese government had 
pressed for the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty. As a 
result of American support for China's position, senior officials from 
the Colonial Office accepted in mid I942 that Britain might have to 
return Hong Kong to Chinese rule as part of a general postwar 
settlement in the Far East. But that attitude was gradually changed 
towards the end of the war; increasingly the retention of British Far 
Eastern territories was seen as a matter of prestige which was crucial 
to the British Empire.'2 
London's concern for British possessions in East Asia was con- 
sistently shown in its discussions with other allied powers on postwar 
arrangements at the Cairo Conference which opened on the 23rd of 
November I943 and again at Teheran when Churchill met President 
Roosevelt, and the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Churchill stated that 
Britain did not desire to acquire any new territory or bases, but it did 
intend 'to hold on to what they had'. He went on to say that 'nothing 
would be taken away from Britain without a war', and mentioned 
'specially Singapore and Hong Kong'.13 The Yalta conference con- 
vened in February I945 and did not alter Britain's status in its col- 
onial territories in East Asia, even though Roosevelt and Stalin 
generally agreed that Western colonial powers should withdraw from 
Southeast Asia at a later stage.'4 When the American ambassador to 
Britain, Patrick Hurley, raised the issue of British colonial possessions 
with the British Prime Minister in March, Churchill 'took him up 
with violence about Hong Kong and said that never would we yield 
an inch of the territory that was under the British flag.'"5 
If the Chinese leaders' desire to recover Hong Kong was equally 
strong, it was not always matched by official rhetoric. Their attitude 
12 Steve Yui-sang Tsang, Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China, and Attempts at 
Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong, 1945-1952 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 
I988), p. 13; Chan Lau Kit-ching, China, Britain and Hong Kong, I895-I945 (Hong 
Kong: Chinese University Press, 1990), pp. 293-309. 13 Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran (Washing- 
ton, 1961), p 554 quoted in Wm Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay 1941-I945: The United 
States and the Decolonization of the British Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 285. 
14 For an account of the Yalta Conference and the agreements for post-war Asia see 
Akira Iriye, The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, I974), pp. 94-7. 15 Note by Churchill II April 1945 PRO F0371/46325, quoted in Wm Roger 
Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 548, see also Raymond A. Callahan, Churchill: Retreatfrom 
Empire (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1984), p. 210. 
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was, using the Hong Kong historian Chan Lau Kit-ching's word, 
'subdued' and the statements on Hong Kong they issued were 'half- 
hearted and sporadic'.16 Hong Kong therefore did not create any real 
difficulties in Sino-British relations during wartime. 
Once the war was over, both British troops and Chinese Nationalist 
troops were prepared to accept the surrender of Hong Kong. Indeed 
Sino-British differences emerged when Chiang Kai-shek insisted that 
he should accept Japan's surrender at Hong Kong as commander-in- 
chief of the China theatre, and the British insisted that Sir Cecil 
Harcourt, Rear-Admiral of the British Pacific Fleet, should accept the 
Japanese surrender on behalf of the British government. Eventually, 
after President Truman's intervention, Chiang agreed that Harcourt 
could accept Japan's surrender on behalf of both Britain and Chiang 
as supreme commander of the China theatre.17 
China under Chiang's leadership was keen to regain Hong Kong, 
but occupying the territory by force was not feasible politically. The 
Nationalist government was preoccupied by its own internal econ- 
omic problems and the communist challenge. It could hardly afford to 
antagonize Britain, the closest ally of the Nationalist government's 
most important backer, the United States. Although Washington, 
suspicious of British imperial ambition, supported Chiang's claim on 
Hong Kong, a unilateral move by China to regain Hong Kong was 
obviously out of the question.18 
Hong Kong, however, remained a major question in Sino-British 
relations. Britain's defeat by the Japanese earlier on, as well as 
China's newly acquired status as one of the five great postwar powers, 
created a strong sense of national pride and identity with China 
among local Hong Kong citizens. The Chinese Nationalist Party also 
took the opportunity to obtain official recognition in Hong Kong and 
Party activities were for the first time organized openly in the colony. 
The Nationalist government's attitude towards Hong Kong's political 
status was also made clear when China's postwar representative in 
Hong Kong, T. W. Kwok, was appointed Special Commissioner for 
Hong Kong, concurrent to his appointment as Special Commissioner 
for Guangdong and Guangxi, rather than as Consul-General.19 
The change of government in Britain in I945 did not fundamentally 
16 Chan Lau Kit-ching, China, Britain and Hong Kong, p. 314. 17 Ibid., pp. 32 -2; Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved, pp. 19-20; Aron Shai, Britain and 
China, 1941-47: Imperial Momentum (London: Macmillan, i984), pp. 120-2. 
18 See Aron Shai, Britain and China, pp. 124-5. 19 Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved, pp. 52, 28-9. 
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alter Britain's stance towards Hong Kong's status. While the Labour 
government was willing to allow self-government and attempted to 
initiate constitutional reforms in British colonial territories, it had no 
intention to relinquish British colonial rule immediately. Hong 
Kong's status was also made complicated by the fact that 'there was 
no possibility of decolonization without giving the territory to 
China.'20 
In the British Embassy's annual report in 1946, Ambassador Ralph 
Stevenson suggested that Hong Kong was the only major potential 
source of friction between Britain and China.21 Stevenson's prognosti- 
cation proved to be accurate. The two governments soon became 
engaged in a dispute over the jurisdiction of the Kowloon walled city, 
a densely populated area on Kowloon side of the colony which was 
once used as a small garrison and administrative compound. Both 
governments issued official statements claiming the jurisdiction of the 
walled city, but neither side pursued the matter further and their 
different positions did not lead to serious difficulties in Sino-British 
relations.22 There was no doubt that London intended to maintain 
British rule in the colony, but its attitude towards whether or not 
Britain should seek to revive its former role in China was rather 
different. 
Towards the end of the war Whitehall's position was that Britain 
did not have the resources to assert its former role as the predominant 
western power in China. Although some old China hands argued for a 
more active policy in China, it was not regarded as realistic. Most 
senior Foreign Office officials dismissed China's importance to Britain 
and argued that the British government should not assume a responsi- 
bility that it could not fulfil. Summing up the Foreign Office's senti- 
ments on China, Assistant Under-Secretary Victor Cavendish- 
Bentinck stated: 'China is not vital to the maintenance of our empire 
and we can do without our China trade. So long as we maintain 
20 D. J. Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development, Vol. 5, Guidance Towards 
Self-Government in British Colonies: I94gI-I97 (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities 
Press, I980), p. 20. Steve Tsang's Democracy Shelved remains the most fascinating 
account of the abortive attempt to bring about constitutional reforms in postwar 
Hong Kong. 21 PRO F037I 63440 F4491/4491/Io. 
22 See Ho Fung-shen, Waijiao Sheng Ya Sishi Nian [Forty Years as a Diplomat] 
(Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, I990), pp. 201-3, and Grantham, Via Ports: 
From Hong Kong to Hong Kong, pp. 130-3. Other useful accounts of the Kowloon 
Walled-City included: Peter Westly-Smith, 'Unequal Treaty; Forlorn, Forbidden and 
Forgotten: Kowloon's Walled City', Kaleidoscope, vol. I no. 3; N. J. Miners, 'A Tale of 
Two Walled Cities: Kowloon and Weihaiwei', Hong Kong Law Journal, 12: 2 (1982). 
323 
JAMES T. H. TANG 
control of seaways, a direct threat from the direction of China is not 
serious'.23 
Thus, paradoxical as it may seem, as far as British imperial inter- 
ests were concerned, China was less important than Hong Kong at 
the end of the Second World War. This attitude had to be seen in the 
context of the general decline of British power and prestige in postwar 
East Asia. 
Three developments were particularly unfavourable to Britain's 
postwar position in East Asia; first, it had been defeated by Japan 
during the war, second, the US had assumed the leading role in the 
war against Japan, third, the tide of Asian nationalism was rising 
quickly. Britain's attitude towards China and Hong Kong was spelt 
out in detail in a stock-taking memorandum in early 1947 by Esler 
Dening, the Foreign Office's Assistant Under-Secretary responsible 
for Far Eastern Affairs. In Dening's view: 'Britain's chief assets in 
China are her physical properties, experience, good-will and the pos- 
session of Hong Kong'. But Britain was not in the position to exploit 
these assets to the full and compete actively in the China market until 
the British economy was revived. Thus he recommended to keep 'a 
commercial foothold in China until better days come'.24 
The British government's attitude towards China and Hong Kong 
in the early postwar years was consistent with this line of thinking: 
Britain could not afford to reassert its pre-war position in China, but 
the retention of Hong Kong was important to empire, and later to 
Britain's role as a major world power, as well as to Britain's future 
comeback in the China market. 
Cold War Politics and Britain's China and Hong Kong 
Policies 
The situation in China changed dramatically towards the end of 1948 
with the collapse of the Nationalist regime. Not only would British 
commercial interests in China be directly affected by the communist 
victory, the retention of Hong Kong as a British colony appeared 
uncertain. To complicate matters further, as the rivalry between the 
23 Minute by Coulson, 6 March 1945; minute by Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, 13 
March 1945, PRO FO37 46232 F I 33I/409/ I. See also Tang, Britain's Encounter with 
Revolutionary China, pp. 15-i6. 
24 PRO FO37i 63549 F2612/2612/Io, also see Aron Shai, Britain and China, pp. 
I50-I; see also Tang, Britain's Encounter with Revolutionary China, pp. i6-i8. 
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Soviet Union and the West intensified, developments in Asia were 
increasingly seen in Cold War terms by Western leaders. 
In December 1948 the Foreign Office presented a paper to the 
Cabinet which contained a detailed assessment of the far-reaching 
implications of the communist victory for British interests in China 
and Hong Kong. This paper, CP(48)299, suggested that if the com- 
munists came to power in China, the retention of Hong Kong as a 
British colony would depend on 'whether the Communists found the 
existence of a well-run British port convenient for their trade with the 
outside world.' The paper said that even if the communists were to 
use a British Hong Kong for trading purposes, the colony would face a 
vast refugee problem. The Foreign Office warned that Hong Kong 
would be 'living on the edge of a volcano.'25 
Thus Hong Kong's political position would depend very much on 
Britain's relations with the Chinese communists. London had 
abandoned any hopes of reviving Britain's former role in postwar 
China; its primary interests in China were largely commercial. After a 
careful assessment of the situation and the limited options available, 
the Foreign Office recommended a policy of 'keeping a foot in the 
door' in China. CP(48)299 recommended that the government should 
seek de facto relations with the communist authorities because of 
British trading interests and British assets in China.26 
Cold War politics, however, made Britain's attempt to adopt a 
pragmatic China policy extremely difficult. In the context of the grow- 
ing suspicion between the Soviet Union and the West, accommodat- 
ing a communist regime would be interpreted as the weakening of 
Western resolve against communist expansionism. By early I946, US 
policy towards the Soviet Union had hardened. Washington's stand, 
as the Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis noted, was that 'expan- 
sionist moves by the Kremlin would be resisted, even at the risk of 
war'.27 On 12 March 1947, in a speech to the Congress seeking 
approval for US assistance to Turkey and Greece, President Truman 
committed the United States openly to confronting the advance of 
communism in all parts of the world.28 
25 PRO CABI29/3I CP(48)299. For a more detailed analysis of CP(48)299 see 
Tang, Britain's Encounter with Revolutionary China, pp. 32-4. 26 Ibid. 
27 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, I941-1947 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 356. 
28 For more details on the Truman doctrine see Gaddis, ibid., ch. io; Walter 
LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War: I945-1980 (New York: John Wiley and 
Sons, 4th edn, I980), ch. 3; Louis J. Hall, The Cold War as History (New York: Harper, 
I967), ch. 12. 
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As the animosity of the US and the USSR grew, Britain had to 
reassess its foreign policies. Since London saw the Soviet-led commu- 
nist bloc as the most serious threat to Britain's security, American 
support against Soviet expansionism was seen as vital to British 
security in Europe. In an often quoted Cabinet paper entitled 'The 
First Aim of British Foreign Policy', Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin 
warned his colleagues in January 1948 that the Soviet Union and its 
allies were posing a direct threat to the West.29 While British defence 
strategists were convinced that the Soviet Union would not take on 
the West immediately, in their eyes Moscow's long-term intention to 
eliminate capitalism from all parts of the world was clear.30 
For British policy-makers hoping that Britain could recover 
economically and maintain its global influence, persuading the US to 
provide necessary backing to a close Anglo-American alliance seemed 
to be the only viable policy option. Although the difficult process of 
decolonization had already begun, London still harboured the hope 
that with US support, combining with the resources of Western 
Europe and its influence with the Commonwealth, Britain's aspira- 
tion to remain a first-rate power could be achieved. There was no 
place for a colonial British empire in the postwar international order, 
but the reincarnation of the empire in a different form might still be 
possible. Bevin told his colleagues that Britain could be a major power 
equal to that of the US and the Soviet Union, 'provided we can 
organize a Western Europe system ..., backed by the power and 
resources of the Commonwealth and of the Americas'.31 This was 
Britain's grand strategy for maintaining its status as a major power in 
the postwar world. 
By allying closely with the United States, Britain was drawn into 
direct confrontation with the Soviet-led communist bloc and had to 
play a full part in the Cold War. The British government thus faced a 
dilemma as the Chinese communists rapidly took control of northern 
China at the end of I948. While establishing a proper working 
friendly relationship with the communist authorities was crucial to 
immediate British commercial interests as well as for the return of an 
29 PRO CAB I29/23 CP(48)6, 4Jan. 1948. 30 A brief account of British analysis of British defence thinking about the nature of 
the Soviet threat is in Beatrice Heuser, 'Stalin as Hitler's Successor' in Heuser and 
O'Neill, Securing Peace in Europe, pp. I8-20. 31 Cabinet paper, PRO CABI29/23 CP(48)6, 4 Jan. 1948. For a discussion of the 
linkage between Britain's postwar imperial ambition and the Cold War see John 
Kent, 'The British Empire and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-49' in Deighton 
(ed.), Britain and the First Cold War, pp. 165-83. 
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economically recovered Britain to the China market in future, such a 
policy might not be politically acceptable in a Cold War climate. 
However, London could still delay making the more difficult decision 
of diplomatic recognition as long as the Chinese communists had not 
taken effective control of the whole of China. When the People's 
Republic of China was inaugurated on I October I949, the British 
government could no longer delay the decision further.32 
London, however, could not go ahead and recognize the Beijing 
government without taking into account sentiments in Washington. 
Sino-US relations deteriorated rapidly in I949, and the Truman 
administration had publicly announced that it did not support 
London's decision of recognizing Beijing. In private, however, 
Washington's position was not totaly rigid. It rejected 'premature' 
recognition of the Beijing government, but not the principle of accord- 
ing it. The Truman administration's concern was centred on the 
question of timing arising partly from the anti-communist domestic 
political climate. The Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, adopted the 
position that the US should 'wait until the dust settles', and accepted 
that Britain would have to pursue a different China policy because of 
its more extensive commercial interests there. The British government 
eventually accorded diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic 
on 6 January i950.33 
Since Anglo-American solidarity was the cornerstone of Britain's 
postwar foreign policy, as Washington's position towards the commu- 
nist government in Beijing hardened, London was under strong press- 
ure to toe the US line. When the limit of British power became more 
32 Two detailed accounts on Britain's decision to accord recognition to the People's 
Republic of China are: Ritchie Ovendale, 'Britain, the United States, and the Recog- 
nition of Communist China', The Historical Journal, I (I983), and D. C. Wolf, "'To 
Secure a Convenience": Britain Recognizes China-1950', Journal of Contemporary 
History, I8, 2 (April I983). Also see Tang, Britain's Encounter with Revolutionary China, 
ch. 2. 33 For a comprehensive discussion of the US attitude towards the recognition 
question see Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Pattern in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and 
the Recognition Controversy, i949-I950 (New York: Columbia, 1983). The Anglo-Ameri- 
can differences were clearly shown in the exchanges between Bevin and Acheson 
during a meeting in December I949: Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary 
of State, 8 Dec. I949, Foreign Relations of the United States, I949, Vol. IX, pp. 219-20; 
Washington to Foreign Office, 8 Dec. I949, PRO F037I 75826 Fi8418/1o23/io. Two 
more general discussions are: Roderick McFarquhar, 'The China Problem in Anglo- 
American Relations' in Wm Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (eds), The 'Special Relation- 
ship': Anglo-American Relations Since I945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), and James 
T. H. Tang, 'Alliance Under Stress: Anglo-American Relations and East Asia, 1949- 
5I' in Heuser and O'Neill (eds), Securing Peace in Europe. 
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evident, London's imperial ambition was quickly turned into a sober 
realization that Britain's status as a great power in the postwar world 
could not be taken for granted. In order to secure US assistance, 
Hong Kong was increasingly used as a political symbol and referred 
to as the Berlin of the East by British officials and politicians. The 
British were themselves engaged in a bitter war with the communists 
in Malaya and Singapore; failure to meet a communist challenge in 
the colony would have dealt a severe blow to British morale and 
prestige in Southeast Asia. The defence of Hong Kong thus became a 
vital link in the common front against communism in Asia.34 British 
arguments for the retention of Hong Kong shifted from defending the 
British Empire to defending Western interests against communist 
encroachment. 
Although Hong Kong became embroiled in Cold War politics in 
1949 as the communists took power in China, British policy towards 
Hong Kong was not shaped simply by political and strategic con- 
siderations. Another crucial factor was the colony's commercial value. 
The Colonial Office estimated in 1949 that the total amount of British 
capital in Hong Kong was about I56 million pounds. The colony was 
also a good operating base for British businessmen to prevent Japan 
from acquiring a dominant position in the commerce of the Far East 
in future. Losing the colony, the Colonial Office maintained, would be 
'a serious blow' to the British economy.35 
While there were a number of political, strategic and economic 
advantages in keeping Hong Kong British, London could not ignore 
the colony's vulnerable position if the Chinese government were 
determined to take it back. Although the Hong Kong garrison was 
reinforced in 1949, British policy-makers were well aware of the fact 
that without China's acquiescence, it would be impossible to maintain 
Hong Kong as a trading port under British rule. At the same time, if 
keeping the colony was important to British interests, London had to 
make a firm stand in Hong Kong. This balancing act, however, was 
not always possible in the context of the Cold War. At the beginning 
of 1950 Washington's stance towards the Beijing government had 
toughened, reflecting growing anti-communist sentiments in the US. 
Britain also encountered difficulties in its efforts to develop a proper 
diplomatic relationship with the People's Republic.36 
34 Note of meeting between the Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth Ambas- 
sadors in Washington, i6 Sept. I949, PRO F037i 76024 FI4305/1024/6IG. 35 PRO CAB 129/35 CP(49)120. 36 A detailed study of the tortuous Sino-British negotiations for the establishment 
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Anglo-Chinese relations were troubled by a number of problems 
including Britain's attitude towards Chinese representation in the 
United Nations, and its attitude towards Nationalist organizations 
and properties in British territories. One tricky question involved 
seventy aircraft in Hong Kong which belonged to two Nationalist 
agencies, the China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) and the 
Central Air Transport Corporation (CATC).37 In November 1949 the 
managing directors of the two agencies flew to Beijing with eleven 
aircraft. This set off a round of claims and counter claims over the 
ownership of the remaining aircraft which involved not only the Com- 
munist and Nationalist governments, but also the US government 
because the aircraft were purchased by CNAC and CATC under 
American lend-lease.38 
The US government was concerned that the aircraft could fall into 
communist hands. After the Chief Justice of Hong Kong ruled in 
April 1950 that the planes belonged to the Beijing government, the 
Americans threatened that if the British government failed to keep the 
aircraft in the colony, the continuance of Marshall Aid and the Mili- 
tary Assistance Programme might be seriously endangered.39 
The British government's attempt to develop a working relation- 
ship with the Chinese authorities and to steer Hong Kong away from 
getting into trouble with China was once again affected by Cold War 
politics. Although British officials feared that turning the aircraft to 
American hands might provoke the Chinese government 'to organise 
strikes, disturbance and sabotage' or to impose an economic embargo 
on the colony as well as affect the Sino-British negotiations on the 
establishment of diplomatic relations, they backed down under 
American pressure. Eventually London instructed the Governor of 
Hong Kong 'to hold up the aircraft by any means which did not 
involve the formal use of statutory powers' and obtained an Order-in- 
of official diplomatic relations is in Tang, Britain's Encounter with Revolutionary China, 
chs 3 and 4. 
37 Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao (Beijing; Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, gg99), 
pp. I2-23, an English edition is available: Diplomacy of Contemporary China (Hong 
Kong: New Horizon Press, 1990), pp. 17-18. The original Chinese version of the 
Sino-British exchanges can be found in Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Duiwai Guanxi 
Wenjianji, vol. I: I949-I950 (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, I957), p. I23. The 
English version can be found in PRO FO37I 83295 FCIo22/518. 38 An official account of the aircraft incident can be found in Annex A to Cabinet 
Paper3 April 1950, PRO CP(5o)6I. 39 Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary and the Minister of State at the Foreign 
Office, 3 April I950, PRO CAB 129/39 CP(5o)6i. 
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Council on o May I950 to keep the aircraft in the colony before 
handing them over to the Americans in i952.40 
London's decision to interfere with the legal process in Hong Kong 
was made because of its concern over Washington's reaction; Anglo- 
American solidarity was obviously more important than Sino-British 
relations. The Governor of Hong Kong was not happy about 
London's action, but there was little he could do; the colony was 
dragged into the wider Cold War confrontation in East Asia. 
Fortunately, Beijing only made an official protest when the British 
government announced that the aircraft were to be detained in Hong 
Kong; it did not attempt to undermine the political stability of the 
colony. 
The Impact of the Korean War on the British Attitude 
towards China and Hong Kong 
Britain's policy towards China and Hong Kong took another turn 
with the outbreak of the Korean War in June I950. The Cold War 
was turned into a hot war when North Korean troops marched across 
the 38th parallel which divided the Korean peninsula into two halves. 
The United States responded swiftly by committing itself militarily to 
resist the North Korean troops from taking over the whole of Korea. 
To American leaders, the North Korean invasion of the South con- 
firmed their fear of the world-wide expansionist intent of communism. 
When President Truman was on his way back to Washington from 
Independence, Missouri, where the President was spending the 
weekend, he reflected on the plane that: 'if South Korea was allowed 
to fall, Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations 
closer to our own shores'. The President therefore publicly con- 
demned the North Koreans and deployed the Seventh Fleet to 
'neutralize' the Taiwan Strait.4' 
In a meeting on 27 June the British Cabinet decided to give full 
support to the American position, but not all Cabinet members 
shared the American interpretation that the invasion was 'centrally- 
directed communist imperialism'. They were also concerned that the 
40 Cabinet meeting, 6 April 1950, PRO CM(5o)i9th meeting; Cabinet paper, 21 
April 1950, PRO CAB 129/39 CP(5o)74; Cabinet meeting 24 April 1950, PRO 
CM(5o)24th meeting. 
41 Harry Truman, The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, vol. 2: Years of Trial and Hope, 
1946-53 (New York: Doubleday, I956), p. 351. 
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deployment of the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait would make 
Britain's relations with China more difficult and provoke the Beijing 
government to foment disorder in Hong Kong.42 
As the military situation in Korea turned critically, American 
pressure on Britain to take part in the Korean conflict also increased. 
London's military advisers, however, held the view that the Korean 
conflict did not directly threaten Europe, and the Soviet Union might 
'stage a diversion elsewhere and we must continually guard against 
this eventuality'. They were concerned that resources vital to the 
security of Europe would be diverted to Korea, an area which was 
considered to be of less strategic importance. However, the British 
government yielded to pressure from Washington again, and 
deployed ground troops to Korea in July.43 
Direct Chinese military involvement in Korea after October 1950 
further widened the gap between the communist Chinese leadership 
and the West. While Britain's diplomatic representatives who were in 
China for the negotiations of the establishment of diplomatic relations 
still remained in Beijing, the two sides became enemies on the Korean 
battlefield. In January 1951 Britain, somewhat reluctantly, supported 
a UN resolution introduced by the US in condemning China as an 
aggressor in Korea. In May the UN Assembly adopted a resolution 
on a strategic embargo. In June the British government imposed 
license controls on all exports to China and Hong Kong. The colony 
together with Macau were blacklisted because China could break the 
embargo by obtaining Western goods through its traditional trading 
connections with both places.44 
Thus the outbreak of the Korean War had far-reaching conse- 
quences for Britain's China policy and Hong Kong's position. As long 
as the hostility in Korea persisted, any hopes that Britain could 
establish official diplomatic relations with the People's Republic 
would be unrealistic. It was in fact rather surprising that British 
diplomats were still allowed to station in China. The Chinese govern- 
ment condemned the UN embargo resolution as 'a malevolent 
42 Cabinet meeting, 27 June 1950, PRO CAB 128/17 CM39(50). Full text of 
Truman's statement in Department of State Bulletin, 3 July I950. 
43 Chief of Staff Meeting, 30 June 1950, PRO DEFE COS(5o) iooth Meeting item 
one. See also Ritchie Ovendale, 'Britain and the Cold War in Asia' in Ritchie 
Ovendale (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945-195I (Leicester: 
Leicester University Press, 1984), pp. 131-2. 
44 UN Doc.A/1799 5th session, General Assembly item 76, pp. 2o-I; General 
Assembly 5th session supplement no. 2oA R.5oo(v), p. 2; Hansard, House of Commons 
Debates, series 5, vol. 489, cols 245-52. 
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attempt to extend aggressive war' and a violation of the UN Charter. 
Apart from the US, Britain was the only country singled out for 
criticism. By agreeing to the embargo, the Chinese government said, 
the British government had 'closed the door for possible negotiations 
and revealed its determination to be the enemy of China.'45 Sino- 
British relations entered a most difficult period, even though their 
informal diplomatic links were not severed. 
Hong Kong also entered a turbulent period as a result of the 
Korean War. Although Beijing made no attempts to de-stabilize the 
political situation in the colony, the economy of Hong Kong suffered 
considerably following the UN embargo on China and the imposition 
of export license control on Hong Kong by London. For years Hong 
Kong had been an entrepot; over two-thirds of the colony's trade was 
with China. The embargo was thus extremely serious for the colony. 
China trade, in the words of Governor Grantham, was Hong Kong's 
'life-blood', and with the imposition of the embargo, it was cut down 
to a 'mere trickle'. In addition to the economic difficulties, the colony 
was burdened by a massive inflow of refugees from China. As Gran- 
tham recalled, many visiting journalists sent home gloomy dispatches 
which predicted 'the early demise of the Colony'.46 Hong Kong's 
economy gradually recovered; the colony was able to shift from an 
entrepot to a thriving manufacturing and industrial city because the 
influx of refugees brought capital and labour.47 
After the Korean War London continued to rule out any possibility 
of self-government for Hong Kong.48 Since an independent Hong 
Kong was regarded as not possible on political grounds, the British 
government did not seek to alter the status of the colony. Britain's 
relations with China remained strained even though the Korean truce 
in I953 had brought about a more relaxed international climate. The 
attitude of both sides had been hardened by the Korean conflict. The 
Conservative Party under Churchill's leadership which had returned 
to power continued to attach great importance to the Anglo-American 
alliance. By then the British commercial empire in China had virtu- 
ally collapsed and London was no longer as enthusiastic about the 
45 ZhongHua Renmin Gongheguo duiwai guanxi wenjianji, i951-53 (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi 
Chubanshe, I958), p. 27. 
46 Alexander Grantham, Via Ports: From Hong Kong to Hong Kong, p. i67. 
47 For a study of the movement of capital into Hong Kong during this period see 
Wong Siu-lun, Emigrant Entrepreneurs: Shanghai Industrialists in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), ch. 3. 
48 Morgan, Guidance Towards Self-Government in British Colonies, p. 20. 
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establishment of official diplomatic relations with the People's 
Republic as in 1949 and early I950.49 
Britain and China moved gingerly towards a better relationship 
only in 1954 when the Geneva Conference in I954 provided the 
opportunity for meetings between the British Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Eden and the Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai. Sub- 
sequently, the two governments agreed to exchange Charge d'Affaires 
with each other, thus establishing formal diplomatic relations. By this 
time the Chinese communists had firmly established their political 
control over China. 
The British government's acceptance of Hong Kong's vulner- 
ability, in many ways, also shaped its policy towards China during the 
I950s. For example, during the Taiwan Straits Crisis in I954 and 
1955, the British government attempted to mediate between the 
People's Republic and the US. The British government was keen to 
prevent an escalation of the crisis because if war broke out it would be 
caught in a situation in which 'the Americans would be bitterly 
resentful if we stood aside and in any case we might be drawn in first 
over Hong Kong if the war became world-wide.'50 
Sino-British Declaration on Hong Kong: The Last Chapter of 
Britain's Imperial Retreat 
The signing of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration on the future of 
Hong Kong closed the final chapter of British imperial venture in the 
Far East. But the decline of British power can be traced to the early 
postwar years when the British political leadership's inability to 
prevent Britain's retreat from East Asia was already evident. She was 
denied inclusion in the ANZUS Treaty, a defence pact concluded in 
September I95I between the United States, Australia, and New Zea- 
land. Later attepts by Churchill, who was returned to Office in 
November, to join ANZUS were also unsuccessful. 
Although the British government was unhappy about Britain's 
exclusion from ANZUS, there was little it could do to change what 
49 
'Policy in the Far East', Cabinet paper, 24 Nov. i953, PRO CAB 129/64 
C(53)330. For an analysis of the changes in Britain's China policy as a result of the 
Korean conflict see Tang, Britain's Encounter with Revolutionary China, chs 3 and 4. 
50 James Murray, Minute, 14 Aug. I954. PRO F037 I/I 1087, quoted in Michael 
Dockrill, 'Britain and the First Chinese Off-Shore Islands Crisis, 1954-55' in Dockrill 
and Young (eds), British Foreign Policy, i945-56, p. I92. 
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Anthony Eden referred to as an 'anomaly' in the Pacific's collective 
defence. For British leaders, who still sought a world role for Britain, 
the defence against communism in East Asia was not just a matter in 
super-power Cold War conflict; it was a matter of Commonwealth 
responsibilities. When Britain became part of the South-East Asia 
Treaty Organization, a collective security arrangement created by the 
US in 1954, British colonies in the region-Hong Kong, Malaya, and 
Borneo-were excluded from SEATO's care.51 
As late as December I964 the British Prime Minister Harold Wil- 
son still insisted that Britain intended to play a world role by main- 
taining a military presence east of Suez. In a Parliamentary debate, 
Wilson asserted: 'I want to make it quite clear that whatever we may 
do in the field of cost effectiveness, value for money and a stringent 
review of expenditure, we cannot afford to relinquish our world 
role'.52 Economic and political realities, however, soon suggested 
otherwise: Britain's formal retreat from East Asia took place when 
London announced on I6 January I968 that British forces would be 
withdrawn from the Far East and the Persian Gulf by the end of 
I971. 
The Beijing government has been consistent in rejecting the legality 
of the Sino-British treaties which led to the establishment of the 
colony of Hong Kong, but effective British rule over the colony 
remained unchallenged until the early i98os. The Chinese govern- 
ment avoided confronting the British authorities in Hong Kong 
directly even when pro-Beijing elements in the colony became 
involved in some of the most serious civil disturbances in the colony 
during the 1950S and the i96os. Although Beijing's official stance 
towards the British presence in Hong Kong has been described as 
'virulent opposition', the colony has enjoyed a high degree of political 
stability after the Chinese communists took power in 1949. In fact the 
British-administered territory has made a significant contribution to 
the Chinese economy, and provided China with a door to the world 
when Beijing was diplomatically isolated by the West. 
51 
Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle (London: Cassell, 
1960), p. 93. A brief discussion of Britain's exclusion from ANZUS and the Com- 
monwealth responsibilities in Southeast Asia is in J. D. B. Miller, 'The "Special 
Relationship" in the Pacific' in Louis and Bull, The 'Special Relationship', pp. 382-4. 
One useful book on SEATO is Leszek Buszynski, SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance 
Strategy (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983). 
52 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, series 5, i6 Dec. i964, cols 423-4. 
53 For a discussion of the final British decision to withdraw completely from Asia 
see Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez, pp. 3 6-26. 
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Anglo-Chinese relations suffered when radical politics swept 
through China during the Cultural Revolution in the I960s, but their 
relations improved rapidly in the 1970s following the Sino-US rap- 
prochement. Direct negotiations over Hong Kong's future began in 
I982 when the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited 
Beijing. By this time, Britain has ceased to be an imperial power in 
Asia. When the imperial ambition disappeared, London began to 
view China as far more important for Britain politically and economi- 
cally than the tiny British colony at the door-step of China. As Britain 
and China began negotiations on the political future of the territory, 
the two governments were, in Ian Scott's words, 'not only seeking a 
settlement on the future of Hong Kong but were also, more subtly, 
laying the foundations for their own future relationship.'54 
For both London and Beijing, much could be gained to their 
mutual benefit if the question of Hong Kong could be resolved with 
minimum political fuss. Britain's position was clear: Hong Kong's 
reversion to China was inevitable. The negotiations were therefore 
about the terms of the reversion, rather than the principle of it. After 
one and a half years of protracted negotiations Britain and China 
agreed in I984 that Hong Kong was to be returned to China in 1997, 
when the lease of the New Territories expired under the Convention of 
Peking. 
There are clearly a number of divergent views on the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration on Hong Kong's future. As David Bonavia 
observed, the agreement was 'variously called a sell-out, a master- 
stroke of diplomacy, a betrayal of five million people, the best thing 
possible in the circumstances, a disgraceful surrender, an historic act 
of justice, and so on.'55 However, as far as Britain's attitude towards 
the colony's political status is concerned, perhaps London's position 
has been more consistent than it sometimes appeared to be if viewed 
from the perspective of Britain's postwar foreign policy changes. 
Conclusion 
In 1949 when the Chinese communists came to power in Beijing, 
policy-makers in London had no illusions about the nature of commu- 
54 Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press, I989), p. 174. 
55 David Bonavia, Hong Kong i997: The Final Settlement (Bromley: Colombus, 1985), 
p. 7. 
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nism in China. Indeed British administrations were facing a commu- 
nist insurgency in Southeast Asia, but Britain was a reluctant partner 
to the Cold War in East Asia. Its postwar policies towards China and 
Hong Kong must be seen in the context of its ambition to remain a 
major international power and to compete, after its economic 
recovery, in the East Asian market with the US, the USSR, and a 
revived Japan. The policy options available to London, however, were 
very much constrained by the limit of resources, and the bi-polar 
international system. 
Hong Kong remained important to British trading interests in East 
Asia and in Cold War politics from the end of the Second World War 
to the mid I950s. The retention of Hong Kong was first justified in the 
name of empire and later the struggle against communist aggression. 
The shift in Britain's policy from empire defense to becoming a 
partner in the Cold War should not obscure its long-term foreign 
policy objective in the postwar world-to remain a leading world 
power. London's determination for keeping Hong Kong in the late 
I940S and early I950s was consistent with its ambition to maintain 
Britain's great power status. 
The extent of the decline of British power, however, had become 
fully evident after the Korean War. In other British territories in East 
Asia, the process of decolonization had already begun; Malaysia was 
to become independent in I957. British ambition to play a leading 
role in international politics was shattered in I956 when Britain was 
humiliated in Suez-after which the final stage of Britain's painful 
process of gradual retreat from Asia began. The transition from 
imperial glory to decolonization and finally the acceptance of a 
diminished British world role was completed by I971 when British 
troops stationed east of Suez were pulled back. As long as Britain had 
an Empire to defend, or an ambition to remain in East Asia as a world 
power, Hong Kong would be kept British. 
In the final analysis, when decolonization converged with the 
realization that Britain could no longer play a leading world role, 
Hong Kong ceased to be crucial in the eyes of policy-makers in 
London. Economic reason alone is not sufficient for a medium power 
to maintain an outpost thousands of miles away without adequate 
military backing, in a region of little strategic and political interests. 
By the I98os, the remnants of empire, as Christopher Hill suggested, 
were little more than 'high-level nuisances', and Britain could gladly 
get rid of them if'it could be done without political embarrassment.'56 
56 Christopher Hill, 'The Historical Background Past and Present in British For- 
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But the moral question remains: should the British government 
hand over a city of six million people, among whom a large number 
are British subjects, to a regime not known for its tolerance of 
individual liberty and political dissent? The answer is provided by a 
Cabinet paper which has not been made available to the public at the 
Public Record Office. In 1949, on the eve of the communist take-over 
in China, the British Cabinet discussed the question of Hong Kong. 
The Cabinet agreed that the British government 'should not discuss 
the future of Hong Kong with a central Chinese government unless 
that government were friendly, democratic, stable and in control of a 
unified China'. The word 'democratic' was later deleted.57 
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